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1ARTICLE III :  FURTHER BUILDING BLOCKS
by Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.   Article III of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) states that:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified
in Article I of the Convention.
2.   This Briefing Paper is complementary to Briefing Paper No 121 which set out the
provisions for the strengthening of Article III in the current version of the draft Protocol for
the strengthening of the BTWC being negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group in the light of some of
the developments that have occurred nationally and regionally in respect of controls of
hazardous materials.  International developments in respect of such controls are considered in
this Briefing Paper.
3.   There are a number of international control regimes relating to transfers of hazardous or
dual-use materials.   Of particular relevance in considering global regimes for chemical and
biological materials is the regime for "banned and severely" restricted chemicals which has
seen the introduction initially of a voluntary system of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) which is
currently being transformed into an international legally binding system following the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade held on 10-11
September 1998 in Rotterdam, The Netherlands.   Another regime that is currently being
negotiated as part of the Biosafety Protocol is a system of Advance Informed Agreement
(AIA) for the transfer of living modified organisms.   Finally, as part of the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) scheme for
Iraq, there is a world-wide system of notification of exports to and imports into Iraq which
includes a wide range of dual purpose goods.   Each of these is considered below.
4.  It has become apparent that there is increasing awareness world-wide because of public
health and environmental concerns of the need to control the transfer of such hazardous
materials.   This paper examines some of the current controls and regulations for such
materials and the international initiatives that are ongoing to strengthen these around the
world.    These are seen as building blocks which might be considered from a point of view of
strengthening the BTWC as well as contributing to the implementation of Article III.   The
challenging goal is to identify how these other national, regional and international activities
can be drawn upon to contribute to the strengthening of the BTWC.
Prior Informed Consent
5.   United Nations Consolidated List.   Following the growth in world trade in chemicals in
the 1960s and 1970s, the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in
                                                
1Graham S Pearson, Article III : Some Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 12, University of Bradford, October
1998.   Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
21977 urged2 Governments to take steps to ensure that potentially harmful chemicals, which
are unacceptable for domestic purposes in the exporting country, are not permitted to be
exported without the knowledge and consent of appropriate authorities in the importing
country.
6.   Some 5 years later, the United Nations General Assembly "aware of the damage to health
and the environment that the continued production and export of products that have been
banned and/or permanently withdrawn on ground of human health and safety ....is causing in
the importing countries" and "considering that many developing countries lack the necessary
information and expertise to keep up with developments in this field"   requested3 that the
Secretary-General prepare and regularly update "a consolidated list of products whose
consumption and/or sale have been banned, withdrawn, severely restricted or not approved
by Governments."   This list is prepared4 and regularly updated jointly by the United Nations,
the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environmental
Programme/International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (UNEP/IRPTC).   This is
part of a continuing effort in the United Nations system aimed at disseminating information
internationally on products harmful to health and the environment.   It provides information
on restrictive regulatory decisions taken by Governments on pharmaceutical, agricultural and
industrial chemicals, and consumer products.   The Fourth Edition covers regulatory actions
taken by 92 Governments on over 600 products.   The introduction to the Fourth Edition4
notes that "It is important to realize that all pharmaceutical and chemical products are
potentially harmful if not correctly used."  and that "The list does not include many widely
used industrial chemicals to which occupational exposure limits have been assigned by
national authorities, and on which information is available in ILO  (International Labour
Organization) and UNEP/IRPTC publications."
7.   In order to ensure that the list focusses on products harmful to health and the
environment, criteria for the inclusion of products were developed in 1985 and transmitted to
Governments for their comments.   These criteria, revised in the light of the comments
received, are reproduced in an Annex to the Consolidated List.    Those for chemical products
are "Banned", "Withdrawn" and "Severely restricted" which are defined as:
Banned - A product that has been prohibited for all uses nationally in one or more
countries by final government regulatory action because of health or environmental
reasons
Withdrawn - A product formerly in commerce that has been withdrawn for all uses
nationally in one or more countries by final voluntary action of the manufacturer
because of health or environmental reasons
Severely restricted - A product for which virtually all uses have been prohibited
nationally in one or more countries by final government regulatory action because of
health or environmental reasons, but for which certain specific uses remain
authorized.
                                                
2United Nations Environment Programme, Governing Council decision 85(V), 25 May 1977.
3United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 37/137, Protection against Products Harmful to health and the
Environment, 109th Plenary Meeting, 17 December 1982.
4United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Consolidated List of Products Whose
Consumption and/or Sale Have Been Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or not Approved by
Governments, Fourth Edition, United Nations, New York, 1991.
38.   The London Guidelines.    UNEP in 1987 adopted5 the London Guidelines for the
Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade6 which were aimed at
enhancing the sound management of chemicals through the exchange of scientific, technical,
economic and legal information.  Special provisions were included regarding "the exchange
of information on banned and severely restricted chemicals in international trade, which call
for cooperation between exporting and importing countries, in the light of their joint
responsibility for the protection of human health and the environment at the global level."
UNEP in adopting these guidelines also identified that additional measures were required to
enable importing countries to give or withhold their consent to particular exports following
receipt of adequate information from exporting countries and that such measures, based on
the principle of prior informed consent should be incorporated in the London Guidelines as
expeditiously as possible.
9.   This principle of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) was incorporated7 in the amended London
Guidelines8 in 1989.     These provide a mechanism for importing countries to formally
record and disseminate their decisions regarding the future importation of chemicals which
have been banned or severely restricted in the exporting countries and outlines the shared
responsibilities of importing and exporting countries and exporting industries in ensuring that
these decisions are heeded.   The Introduction to the Guidelines states that "Although these
Guidelines have not been prepared specifically to address the situation of developing
countries, they nevertheless provide a framework for the establishment of procedures for the
effective use of chemicals in these countries.   Implementation of the Guidelines should thus
help them to avoid serious and costly health and environmental problems due to ignorance
about the risks associated with the use of chemicals, particularly those that have been banned
or severely restricted in other States."
10.   The PIC procedure is being implemented jointly by the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations which leads for pesticides and UNEP through the
IRPTC (International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals) which leads for chemicals.
Each participating country - of which, by February 1998, there were 152 - nominates a
Designated National Authority (DNA)9 to serve as a focal point for the operation of the PIC
procedure.   Some countries have designated one authority for all chemicals while others have
designated two, one with responsibility for pesticides and the other for other chemicals.   The
DNA is generally a government department or office responsible for broad policy decisions
with the authority to decide which chemicals may be used in the country.   In the UK, it is the
Chemicals and Biotechnology Division of the Department of the Environment while in the
USA it is the Assistant Administrator, Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances of the
Environmental Protection Agency.
                                                
5United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Fourteenth Session,
UNEP/GC.14/26, 10 July 1987.    Decision 14/27 of 17 June 1987.
6United Nations Environment Programme, Programme Matters, UNEP/GC.14/17, 2 April 1987, Annex IV:
London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade
7United Nations Environment Programme, Governing Council  Decision 15/30 of 25 May 1989.
8United Nations Environment Programme, London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in
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9UNEP/FAO Register of Designated National Authorities for the Implementation of the Information Exchange
and PIC Procedures of the London Guidelines and the International Code of Conduct, Geneva and Rome,
February 1998.   Available on the web at http://irptc.unep.ch/pic/
411.  The functions of the DNA in respect of the import of banned or severely restricted
chemicals are to receive information on exports from exporting States, to transmit requests
for further information as required to exporting States, to advise and assist import control
authorities, to strengthen national decision-making procedures and import control
mechanisms, to ensure that decisions apply uniformly to all import sources and to domestic
production of chemicals for domestic use, and to encourage that chemicals subject to PIC be
purchased only from sources in exporting countries which are participants in that procedure.
Insofar as exports of banned or severely restricted chemicals are concerned, the function of
the DNA is to ensure the provision or transmittal of information on exports, to respond to
requests for information from other States, especially as regards sources of precautionary
information on the safe use and handling of the chemicals concerned, to communicate PIC
decisions to their export industry, and to implement appropriate procedures, within their
authority, designed to ensure that exports do not occur contrary to the PIC decisions of
participating importing countries.
12.   Participating countries provide information on control actions they have taken to ban or
severely restrict chemicals by completing a Notification of Control Action form which gives
competent authorities in other States the opportunity to assess the risks associated with the
chemical and to make timely and informed decisions thereon having regard to local
environmental, public health, economic and administrative conditions.   The minimum
information to be provided is the chemical identification/specification of the chemical, a
summary of the control action taken and the reasons for it and whether additional information
is available.   The reasons supporting the control action should be based on a national review
of scientific data, information or analysis which indicate that use under expected conditions
within the country may give rise to an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment.
Any chemical banned or severely restricted in at least one country after 1 January 1992 is
eligible for inclusion in the PIC procedure;  any chemicals banned or severely restricted prior
to that date which have been the subject of control actions taken in 5 or more countries may
also be eligible.
13.   Once a chemical has been identified for inclusion in the PIC procedure, a Decision
Guidance Document (DGD) is prepared by FAO/UNEP and sent to each participating country
(through the DNAs) together with an Importing Country Response form.   The DGD provides
a summary of toxicological and environmental characteristics, known usage, possible
exposure routes, measures to reduce exposure and regulatory actions taken by some countries
to ban or severely restrict the chemical, with corresponding reasons for their actions.   The
DGD is intended to help Governments assess the risks connected with the handling and use of
the chemical and to make more informed decisions about future import and use taking into
account local conditions.     The DNA then completes an Importing Country Response form
indicating whether to accept import, refuse import or allow import under certain conditions.
The response is sent to the FAO/UNEP Secretariat who summarize the import decisions and
circulate these to DNAs every six months10.   Governments of exporting countries shall, upon
receipt of importing countries decisions, transmit them to their industry.   In addition, this
information is also included in the regular updates of the Consolidated List of Products whose
Consumption and/or Sale have been Banned, Withdrawn or Severely Restricted.
14.   The aim of the PIC procedure is to ensure that a banned or severely restricted chemical
is not exported without the consent of the importing country.    The Guidelines require that if
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5an export is planned of a chemical banned or severely restricted in the exporting State, then
the exporting State should ensure that the DNA of the importing State is provided with
relevant information to remind the importing State of the original notification by the
exporting State of control action and to alert it to the fact that an export is planned.   The
minimum information to be provided is a copy of the information provided at the time of
notification of the control action, the indication that an export of the chemical will occur and
an estimate of the quantity to be exported annually as well as any shipment-specific
information that might be available.    Such information is to be provided to the State of final
destination and to UNEP/IRPTC.   It is also clear that the PIC procedure is applied to
chemicals that have multiple use.   For example, the six monthly PIC circular11 of import
decisions for some chemicals has in the column headed "Final Decision on Import" the words
"Prohibit for plant protection use" and then in the column headed "Conditions for Import" has
the words "For uses other than plant protection, written authorization is required for import".
15.   The banned and severely restricted chemicals thus far subject to the PIC procedure are
pesticides and industrial chemicals; last September five organophospates -- methamidophos,
methyl parathion, monocrotophos, parathion and phosphamidon -- were added to some 17
pesticides and 5 industrial chemicals  which were already the subject of DGDs.11.    In some
cases, a specific chemical is the subject of a DGD such as fluoroacetamide, parathion or
ethylene oxide, whilst other DGDs apply to a group of chemicals such as mercury compounds
and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), except mono- and dichlorinated.
16.   EU Regulation.   In the European Union, a legally binding Council Regulation (EEC)
No 2455/92 was adopted12 in 1992 which requires exporters of chemicals which are banned
or severely restricted in the European Union to provide information to importing countries
about these chemicals.   This regulation implements the UNEP/FAO PIC scheme in the EU.
Member Governments of the EU are legally required, as well as formally committed, to
implement EEC Regulations.   Consequently it is a legal requirement for an exporter to
provide the designated national authority of the Member State in which he is located with
information about the export from the Community to a third country for the first time of a
chemical subject to the Regulation no later than 30 days before the export is due to take place.
The designated national authority has then to ensure that the appropriate authorities of the
country of designation receive notification at least 15 days before export;   copies of the
notification are to be copied to the Commission which shall forward it to the designated
national authorities of the other Member States and to UNEP/IRPTC.   The notification
provides information about the identity of the chemical, information on precautions to be
taken, summary of the regulatory restrictions and the reasons for them, the expected date of
first export, country of designation, use category (whether plant protection product, industrial
chemical or consumer chemical) and the estimated amount of the chemical to be exported to
the destination country in the next year.   The regulation requires the exporter to comply with
the decision of the country of destination participating in the PIC procedure.
                                                
11FAO/UNEP Joint Programme for the Operation of Prior Informed Consent, Update on Implementation as of
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Available on the web at http://irptc.unep.ch/pic/
12Council Regulation (EEC) No 2455/92 of 23 July 1992 concerning the import and export of certain dangerous
chemicals, Official Journal of the European Communities, L251, Volume 35, 29 August 12992, pp 13-22.   See
also European Chemicals Bureau, Informing the Importer, Guide to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2455/92
concerning the import and export of certain dangerous chemicals, 1996.
617.   The Rio Summit.  The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
held in Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992 (the Earth Summit) proclaimed a set of
Principles13which were amplified in a series of Chapters and programme areas;  for each the
bases for action, objectives, activities and means of implementation are addressed.   These
include:
Chapter 19 Environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals, including
prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and dangerous products.
Within these chapters there are areas addressing the protection of people and the environment
such as:
Expanding and accelerating international assessment of chemical risks (Chapter 19,
Section A)
Information exchange on toxic chemicals and chemical risks (Chapter 19, Section C)
Prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and dangerous products (Chapter
19, Section F)
18.   Of particular interest, are various sections of Chapter 19 (Prevention of illegal
international traffic in toxic and dangerous products).     Thus Section C on information
exchange has the objectives of promoting intensified exchange of information on chemical
safety, use and emissions among all involved parties and of achieving "by the year 2000, as
feasible, full participation in and implementation of the PIC procedure, including possible
mandatory applications through legally binding instruments".     Section F notes that there is
currently no global international agreement on traffic in toxic and dangerous products (toxic
and dangerous products are those that are banned, severely restricted, withdrawn or not
approved for use or sale by Governments to protect public health and the environment).
However, it was noted that there was international concern that illegal international traffic in
these products is detrimental to public health and the environment, particularly in developing
countries as acknowledged by the General Assembly in resolutions 42/183 and 44/22614.   It
went on to say that further strengthening of international and regional cooperation is needed
to prevent illegal transboundary movement of toxic and dangerous products.   The following
activities are detailed:
Governments, according to their capacities and available resources and with the
cooperation of the United Nations and other relevant organizations, as appropriate
should:
a Adopt, where necessary, and implement legislation to prevent the illegal
import and export of toxic and dangerous products
                                                
13United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  Rio de Janeiro,
3- 14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26, 12 August 1992.    See also Earth Summit '92,  The United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992, Regency Press, London, 1992.
14United Nations General Assembly, Traffic in and disposal, control and transboundary movements of toxic and
dangerous products and wastes, Resolution 44/226, 85th Plenary Meeting, 22 December 1989.
7b.   Develop appropriate national enforcement programmes to monitor
compliance with such legislation, and detect and deter violations through
appropriate penalties.
19.   A legally binding PIC procedure.  The UNEP Governing Council at its meeting in
May 1991 adopted15 resolution 16/35 on Toxic Chemicals requesting further urgent action be
taken to strengthen the legal basis of the amended London Guidelines taking into
consideration experience gained in the implementation of the Guidelines and the PIC
procedure.   At the UNEP meeting in May 1995, resolution 18/12 was adopted16 to develop
an internationally legally binding instrument for the application of the PIC procedure.    This
resolution followed consideration of a report17 by the Executive Director of UNEP which
noted that one of the objectives of programme area C of Chapter 19 of Agenda 21 was to
achieve by 2000 full participation in and implementation of the PIC procedure, including
possible mandatory applications through legally binding instruments.   Resolution 18/12
authorised UNEP in conjunction with FAO to convene "an intergovernmental negotiating
committee with a mandate to prepare a legally binding instrument for the application of the
prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals in international trade."
The resolution also called for the convening of "a diplomatic conference for the purpose of
adopting and signing an internationally legally binding instrument for the application of the
prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals in international trade,
preferably not later than early 1997."
20.   The first meeting of the intergovernmental negotiating committee for an international
legally binding instrument for the application of the PIC procedure was held18 in Brussels in
March 1996 under the chairmanship of Ms Rodriguez of Brazil.     This session made rapid
progress, agreed quickly on the rules of procedure, and completed a preliminary review of a
draft outline of the future agreement.  The second meeting was held in September 1996 in
Nairobi, Kenya which made further progress producing 24 pages of draft Convention text
with most of the articles having been extensively discussed.     Further development of the
text of the Protocol took place at the third meeting was held in May 1997 in Geneva and the
fourth meeting held in October 1997 in Rome and was finalized at the fifth meeting held in
March 1998 in Brussels19.    Five meetings each of one week has seen the agreement of a
Convention of 30 Articles and 5 Annexes.   A diplomatic conference, the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, hosted by the Government of the
Netherlands, was held in Rotterdam on 10 - 11 September 1998 to officially adopt and sign
the new Convention.
                                                
15United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Sixteenth Session,
UNEP/GC.16/27, 30 June 1991.    Decision 16/35 of 31 May 1991.
16United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Eighteenth Session,
UNEP/GC.18/40, 13 June 1995.    Decision 18/12 of 26 May 1995.
17United Nations Environment Programme, Policy Issues, UNEP/GC.18/7, 27 February 1995.
18United Nations Environment Programme/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an Internationally Legally Binding Instrument for the
Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade on the Work of its First Session, UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.1/10, 21 March 1996.  Available on
the web at http://irptc.unep.ch/pic/
19United Nations Environment Programme/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an Internationally Legally Binding Instrument for the
Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade on the Work of its Fifth Session, UNEP/FAO/PIC/INC.5/3, 17 March 1998.    Available on
the web at http://irptc.unep.ch/pic/
821.   The new Convention will enter into force when 50 countries have ratified.   The
Preamble recognizes that "trade and environmental policies should be mutually supportive" to
achieve sustainable development.   The treaty aims at protecting "human health, including the
health of consumers and workers, and the environment."   It requires that harmful pesticides
and chemicals that have been banned or severely restricted in at least two countries shall not
be exported unless explicitly agreed by the importing country.   The information about the
new Convention states that "As a first among the multilateral environmental agreements,
Governments have agreed to continue to implement the voluntary PIC procedure using the
new procedures of the Convention until the Convention formally enters into force" thereby
avoiding any break in the implementation of the PIC procedure.    The 27 chemicals currently
subject to the voluntary PIC procedure will be carried forward into the legally binding
Convention.   Under the treaty, exporting countries will be legally bound to inform importing
countries about exports of chemicals banned or severely restricted in the exporting country.
This export notification will be required prior to the first export and be repeated for the first
export each year.   Countries that ratify the treaty will be obliged to enforce the agreement at
national level and to create enforcement mechanisms that will control commercial exports
and exporters.   In developing countries and countries in transition, technical assistance shall
be promoted for the development of the infrastructure and the capacity  necessary to manage
chemicals.
22.    The Convention contains provisions for the exchange of information  among Parties and
provides for a national decision-making process  regarding import and compliance by
exporters with these decisions.   The provisions regarding information exchange include:
* The requirement for a Party to inform other Parties of each ban or severe restriction
on a chemical it implements nationally;
* The possibility for a developing country Party or a Party with an economy in
transition to inform other Parties that it is experiencing problems caused by a severely
hazardous pesticide formulation under conditions of use in its territory;
* The requirement for a Party that plans to export a chemical that is banned or
severely restricted for use within its territory, to inform the importing Party that such
export will take place, before the first shipment and annually thereafter;
* The requirement that an exporting Party, when exporting chemicals that are to be
used for occupational purposes, shall ensure that a safety data sheet that follows an
internationally recognized format, setting out the most up-to-date information
available, is sent to the importer;
* The requirement that exports of chemicals included in the PIC procedure and other
chemicals that are banned or severely restricted domestically, when exported, are
subject to labelling requirements that ensure adequate availability of information with
regard to risks and/or hazards to human health or the environment.
Decisions taken by the importing Party must be trade neutral; that is, if the Party decides it
does not consent to accepting imports of a specific chemical, it must also stop domestic
production of the chemical for domestic use or imports from any non-party.
923.  The proformas20 for the "Notification of Control Action to Ban or Severely Restrict a
Chemical" , for "Information Regarding Export" and for "Importing Country Response" set
out the information required.   Notification of Control Action forms requires information on
the identity of the chemical, the major use categories within the agricultural, industrial and
consumer use sectors, the uses controlled and the uses still allowed together with the reasons
for taking the control action relevant to human health and the environment.   The Export form
likewise requires information on the identity of the chemical, the use categories in the country
of export and information regarding the intended use in the country of import together with
estimated annual quantities.   The Importing Country Response requires information on the
identity of the chemical and on the status of the use of the chemical -- is it registered or
approved, is it currently used, is it currently imported, is it currently manufactured? -- as well
as the final or interim decision regarding import.   The proformas are completed by the
designated national authorities and are copied to the PIC Convention Secretariat which at
intervals circulates collated information to the States Parties.   The Convention in Article 14
on Information Exchange specifically states that certain information shall not be regarded as
confidential for the purpose of the PIC Convention:  the information provided in the
Notification of Control Action forms and information on pesticides to be controlled,
information provided in safety data sheets, information on precautionary measures and the
summary results of the toxicological and ecotoxicological tests.
Analysis
24.   The PIC Convention has functioned through a voluntary procedure involving 152
countries which has controlled the export and import of "restricted and severely banned
chemicals".   The procedures have been legally binding within the European Union since
1992 and are being transformed now into a legally binding Convention.   The information
required on, the transparency of and the control of the uses of chemicals provide a useful
model which might be helpful in considering measures to improve the implementation of
Article III of the BTWC.
Advance Informed Agreement
25.  The past decade has seen an increasing awareness of the importance of protecting health
and the environment.   This was highlighted by the holding of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development21 in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 (the Earth Summit) which
saw the adoption of a set of Principles, Agenda 21 and the opening for signature the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)22.     The Principles are amplified in a series of
Chapters and programme areas which include "Chapter 16 Environmentally sound
management of biotechnology"   which has a section (D) on "enhancing safety and
developing international mechanisms for cooperation."    This states that:
 "there is a need for further development of internationally agreed principles of risk
assessment and management of all aspects of biotechnology, which should build
upon those developed at the national level.   Only when adequate and transparent
                                                
20Available on the web at http://irptc.unep.ch/pic/
21United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  Rio de Janeiro,
3- 14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26, 12 August 1992.    See also Earth Summit '92,  The United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992, Regency Press, London, 1992.
22Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro 5 June 1992, HMSO, Cm 2127,
January 1993.   Also available as United Nations, UNEP/CBD/94/1, Geneva, November 1994.
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safety and border-control procedures are in place will the community at large be
able to derive maximum benefit from, and be in a much better position to accept the
potential benefits and risks of, biotechnology." [Emphasis added].
26.  The desirability of trans-border controls was echoed in the legally binding CBD which
entered into force in December 1993.   Paragraph 3 of Article 19 on Handling of
Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits states that:
"The Parties shall consider the need for an modalities of a protocol setting out
appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in
the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism
resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity." [Emphasis added]
27.   In November 1995 an open–ended Ad Hoc Working Group  was set up to negotiate in:
 "the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms, a
protocol on biosafety, specifically focusing on transboundary movement, of any
living modified organism resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse
effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity..." [Emphasis
added].
Its first meeting26 was held in July 1996 when  an Advance Informed Agreement (AIA)
procedure was identified as a key component of the protocol.   The third Conference of
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity held in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 4 to 15
November 1996 urged the Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety to complete its work on
developing a protocol in 1998 as a matter of urgency;  four further meetings of the Ad Hoc
Working Group have been held in May 1997, October 1997, February 1998 and August 1998.
28.   At the fourth meeting of the Conference of Parties to the CBD held on 4 - 15 May 1998,
Decision IV/323 was agreed which decided that the final meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc
Working Group on Biosafety and an extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties to
adopt the Protocol on Biosafety would be held in February 1999. The decision also
determined that the Protocol should be opened for signature at the Headquarters of the United
Nations in New York no later than three months from the date of its adoption by the
Conference of the Parties.
29.   Consequently, it is clear that the negotiations to develop a protocol to ensure that living
modified organisms are handled safely, used and transferred without danger to human health
and to the environment is close to completion.
30.  As might be expected, the requirements of the Biosafety Protocol are still being finalized.
However, it is clear that the Protocol will include provisions for an Advanced Informed
Agreement (AIA) procedure to be applied to the transboundary transfer of living modified
organisms (LMOs).   Article 4 of the draft Protocol24 addresses the notification procedure for
                                                
23United nations Environment Programme, Convention on Biological Diversity, Fourth Conference of Parties,
Bratislava, Slovakia, 4 - 15 may 1998, Decision IV/3.  Issues related to Biosafety,  Available on the web at
http://www.biodiv.org/cop4/FinalRep-/3.html
24United Nations Environment Programme, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working
Group on Biosafety, Montreal, 5-13 February 1998, UNEP/CBD/BSWG/4/4, 13 February 1998.
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AIA which requires, prior to the transboundary movement of LMOs, the provision of specific
information to the appropriate authority of the importing State.   The information to be
provided is specified in Annex I of the Protocol  as:
a.  Designation [and classification of biosafety levels] of LMO(s) [or products
thereof].
b.  Name and address of the exporter.
c.  Name and address of the importer.
d. Common name, taxinomic status, [source and characteristics] of recipient
organism [and donor organism].
e.  Centre of origin/genetic diversity [if known] relevant to the organism that has
been modified.
f.  Description of DNA/RNA fragment(s)/traits introduced or modified and resulting
characteristics of the LMO [or products thereof]
g.  Intended use of the LMO [or products thereof] [if known].
h.  Quantity of LMOs [or products thereof] to be transferred or volume and physical
state of culture.
i.  A [known and available] risk assessment report [carried out on the LMO [or
products thereof] in question] in accordance with the risk assessment parameters as
stated in Annex II of this Protocol.
j.  Suggested methods to ensure safe handling, storage, transport and use, including
packaging, [labelling,] documentation, disposal and contingency procedures.
k.  Intended date[s] of [first] [transfer] [movement].
l.  Declaration that the information is [factually] correct.
Article 5 of the draft Protocol addresses the response to AIA notification which includes, in
the current draft, the provision for the importing Party to inform the notifier whether further
information in accordance with Annex II Risk Assessment is required.   Annex II sets out in
considerable detail the information required for carrying out the risk assessment.
Analysis
31.  It is evident that a legally binding Protocol to address transboundary transfers of living
modified organisms is close to completion which is likely to have similar requirements for
information exchange and decision prior to first import to those of the PIC Convention.   The
Biosafety Protocol again provides a further model which might be helpful in considering
measures to improve the implementation of Article III of the BTWC.
Import/export system for Iraq.
32.  Following the Gulf War of 1990/1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 68725 which required inter alia  the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction as well as measures to prevent their reconstruction, under the supervision of
                                                
25United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution establishing detailed measures for a cease fire,
including deployment of a United Nations Observer Unit; arrangements for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait
borders; the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their
reconstitution, under the supervision of a Special Commission and Director General of the IAEA; and creation
of a compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
S/RES/687(1991) 3 April 1991.
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a special commission (UNSCOM) and the Director General of the IAEA. This Resolution
includes the requirement for:
"... the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a
plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this
paragraph, to be submitted to the Council for approval within one hundred and
twenty days of the passage of this resolution;"
33.  At the beginning of October 1991, the Secretary General transmitted26 to the Security
Council the plan for the future monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the
destruction or removal of weapons specified in Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).  This
plan included:
specific provisions for the monitoring and verification, from within Iraq, of any
eventual import by Iraq.
and went on to note that:
The efficacy of these provisions would be enhanced if they were complemented by
transparency and timely information as regards any future sale or supply by other
States to Iraq of relevant items with dual use....The Plan ...contains in its annexes lists
of items relevant to the monitoring and verification, from within Iraq, of prohibited
items as well as items with dual use.   These should be taken into account in the
development of a mechanism related to the sale or supply of items to Iraq by other
countries.
These plans was approved by the Security Council a week later when Resolution 715 (1991)
was adopted27 on 11 October 1991.  The Resolution inter alia requested that "a mechanism
for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the
implementation of section C of resolution 687(1991) and other relevant resolutions,
including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder"   be developed.
34.  This mechanism was developed during the following years and in March 1996 the United
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 105128 which approved an export/import
monitoring mechanism to monitor Iraq's exports and imports of dual-purpose capabilities to
ensure that Iraq does not reconstitute its programs for weapons of mass destruction.  The
resolution recognised that the export/import mechanism was not a regime for international
licensing, but rather for the timely provision of information by States in which companies
were located which were contemplating sales of supplies to Iraq of items covered by the plans
for ongoing monitoring and verification.   The mechanism would not impede Iraq’s legitimate
right to import and export for non-proscribed purposes, items and technology necessary for
the promotion of its economic and social development.  The resolution"calls upon all States
to adopt as soon as possible such measures as may be necessary under their national
                                                
26United Nations Security Council,  Report of the Secretary General submitting the plan, revised pursuant to
the adoption of Security Council resolution 707(1991), for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's
compliance with the destruction or removal of weapons specified in Security Council resolution 687(1991),
S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October 1991.
27United Nations Security Council,  Security Council Resolution approving the plans submitted by the
Secretary-General and the Director General of the IAEA, S/RES/715(1991), 11 October 1991.
28United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1051(1996), S/RES/1051(1996), 27 March 1996.
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procedures to implement the mechanism."   The resolution also affirmed that the mechanism
approved was without prejudice to and shall not impair the operation of existing or future
non-proliferation agreements or regimes on the international or regional level including
arrangements referred to in Resolution 687 (1991), nor shall such agreements or regimes
impair the operation of the mechanism.  The mechanism would enter into force for Iraq not
later than 60 days after the adoption of the resolution.
35.    The mechanism29 requires the timely notification by all States of any items identified in
the plans30 for ongoing monitoring and verification.   Both Iraq and the Governments of
suppliers are required to provide these notifications in advance of shipment.   If an item, the
import of which should have been notified under the mechanism, but was not, is found in
Iraq, the import would constitute a case of non-compliance with the monitoring regime
established by the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.   The strong presumption
would be that the item had been procured for prohibited purposes and so, as such, would be
subject for disposal by UNSCOM/IAEA.   The resolution approves the establishment of a
joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit at UN headquarters to operate the regime.  States are called upon
to adopt national measures to implement the mechanism as soon as possible.31  This
export/import regime is designed to complement the ongoing monitoring and verification
system as required under Security Council resolution 715 (1991).
36.   In September 1996, the Secretary-General wrote32 to the President of the Security
Council to advise the Security Council that 1 October 1996 would be the effective date from
which states would provide notification of exports to Iraq as required under the export/import
mechanism approved in Resolution 1051 (1996).    As sanctions on Iraq have not been lifted,
the export-import mechanism was able to initially start functioning at what could be
described as a pilot scale level, through the export-import requests arising from UNSCR 986
(1995) which allows a limited amount of Iraqi oil to be sold for food for humanitarian
purposes; by April 1997, some six months experience had been gained largely for dual-
purpose chemical and biological-related materials and equipment.  This had involved some
30 transactions, each of which can involved a number of different items and different delivery
dates, associated with some 80 notification forms.    This export-import mechanism has
shown that exports of sensitive of dual-use items can be made to Iraq as the ongoing
monitoring and verification (OMV) system provides UNSCOM and the exporting states with
confidence that what has been exported will not be misused.
37.  The note33 by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM which forwarded the revised
detailed annexes listing the items relevant to the export/import mechanism states that
                                                
29United Nations Security Council, Letter from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to the President of the
Security Council forwarding a proposal for a mechanism to monitor Iraq's exports and imports of dual-use
capabilities, S/1995/1017, 7 December 1995
30United Nations Security Council Resolution 715(1991), S/RES/715(1991), 11 October 1991 approved the
plans submitted in S/22871/Rev. 1, 2 October 1991 and S/22872/Rev. 1, 20 September 1991.    These plans
were updated in S/1995/208, 17 March 1995 and a compendium of terms was provided in S/1996/303.
31Information from the News Chronology, Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 32, June 1996, p. 28.
32United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 24 September 1996 from the Secretary-General and the
Director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the President of the Security Council,
S/1996/805, 30 September 1996.
33United Nations Security Council, Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance
with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991),  Revised Annexes II, III, and IV,
S/1995/208, 17 March 1995.
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"in the course of developing the mechanism, it became clear that, for the annexes to
the plan to serve, as intended, as lists of items to be reported by the exporting
countries to the Special Commission and IAEA, it was necessary to elaborate upon
generic descriptions in those Annexes so that customs and control authorities would
know precisely what items should be subject to notification."
The detailed lists for biological materials and equipment specified in the detailed annexe are
reproduced as an Annex to this Briefing Paper.   As might be expected, these are even more
comprehensive than the lists of biological materials and agents in the UK national and the
European Union and Australia Group listings34.
Analysis
38.   The export/import mechanism that exists for imports of dual-use items to Iraq embraces
a much broader range of dual-purpose items than those controlled by the UK, the European
Union and the Australia Group export control regimes.   As the Security Council Resolution
called upon "all States to adopt as soon as possible such measures as may be necessary
under their national procedures to implement the mechanism"  , it would be reasonable to
assume that a number of States have already taken steps to set up the necessary national
infrastructure to implement this export/import mechanism.    This would appear to be even
more relevant to the strengthening of Article III of the BTWC than either the PIC Convention
or the Advanced Informed Agreement mechanisms.
Conclusions
39.   In considering both Briefing Paper No 12 and this Briefing Paper, it is evident that
arrangements are already in place within countries such as the United Kingdom for the
monitoring and control of exports of biological materials and equipment which enable the
United Kingdom to meet its obligations under Article III of the BTWC.   These control
regimes have been harmonized within the European Union and also more widely through the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.   In addition, there are also international
export/import mechanisms that have been in operation on a voluntary basis for "banned and
severely restricted chemicals" for a number of years and are now becoming the subject of a
legally binding Convention, are being negotiated for living modified organisms and are in
operation under UN Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996) for a wide range of biological
materials and equipment of direct relevance to the BTWC.   These various regimes and
mechanisms provide a useful basis which could with advantage be drawn upon in devising
appropriate measures to strengthen the implementation of Article III in the Protocol being
negotiated by the AHG to strengthen the BTWC.
                                                
34These listings are reproduced in Graham S Pearson, Article III : Some Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 12,
University of Bradford, October 1998.   Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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ANNEX:   SCR 1051 (1996) EXPORT/IMPORT MECHANISM
(Detailed biological materials and equipment as listed in S/1995/208, 17 March 1995)
Revised annex III to the Special Commission's Plan
Provisions related to biological items
1. The following list contains equipment* , biological material  and other items capable
of being used  for the development, production or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons
or of a  biological and toxin weapons capability and, therefore, subject to monitoring and
verification  in accordance with paragraphs 34 to 38 of the Plan:
1.1 microorganisms, 35 other  organisms  and  toxins   Including purified or crude
material.  meeting the criteria for risk groups  IV, III and II according to the
classification in the World  Health Organization (WHO)  Laboratory Biosafety
Manual (Geneva 1993, second edition), and genetic material for such toxins;
1.2 detection  and assay  systems for risk  groups IV, III,  and II  microorganisms
and toxins,  or for  genetic material,  including  immunological  assays,   gene
probe assays and other specific detection systems;
1.3 equipment designed or accepted for use for processing, handling, transporting
or storing microorganisms, their products or components, including toxins, or
other biological material including foodstuffs, including:
1.3.1 centrifugal separators or decanters for continuous or semi-continuous
operation;
1.3.2 continuous flow centrifuge rotors;
1.3.3 plate press filter separators;
1.3.4 cross-flow or tangential filtration equipment  with  a filter  area  of 0.5
square  metres or greater;
1.3.5  spray drying equipment;
1.3.6 freeze-drying (lyophilisation)  equipment with a condenser capacity
greater than  1 kg of ice per 24hours;
1.3.7 pressure cell disruption equipment or continuous flow ultrasonic cell
disruption equipment;
1.3.8 chromatography  equipment  for  preparative separations;
                                                
*"Equipment" means complete systems and any components or reagents thereof.
35 For the purposes of the Plan, full lists of the microorganisms, other organisms and toxins concerned  have
been  enumerated in two lists, one covering  risk  groups  IV and  III  (List  1), the other covering risk group II
(List 2). These lists are contained in an Explanatory Note which follows  on the appendix  to this annex.
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1.3.9 pharmaceutical milling equipment;
1.3.10 drum drying equipment;
1.3.11 jacketed vessels; and
1.3.12 control units, valves and filters for the above types of equipment;
1.4 biohazard containment equipment and decontamination equipment, including:
1.4.1 facilities, rooms or other enclosures meeting the physical containment
criteria for P3 or P4 (BL3, BL4, L3, L4) biological containment as
defined in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and using laminar or
turbulent air flow clean air conditions as specified for pharmaceutical,
biotechnology, vaccine or other applications;
1.4.2 biological safety cabinets meeting Class I, II and III  containment
standards, as defined in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual;
1.4.3 safety cabinets allowing  manual or remote operations to be performed
within at Class I, II or III biological containment levels, including
flexible film isolators, rigid isolators, dry boxes, glove boxes,
anaerobic chambers, interconnected cabinet lines, isolator lines and
secondary containment  systems designed to enclose fermenters or
downstream processing equipment;
1.4.4 rubber gloves specifically designed for use with safety cabinets and
biological safety cabinets;
1.4.5 autoclaves, with an internal volume  of 0.3m3 or more, designed to
sterilise infectious material;
1.4.6 other waste disposal systems for infectious material, such as liquid
waste treatment systems, solid waste treatment systems, liquid waste
disposal systems, solid waste disposal systems and incinerators; and
1.4.7 positive pressure air-fed  suits, half suits, helmets and respirators;
1.5 equipment  designed or  accepted for  use for  the microencapsulation  of
living   microorganisms,   their products   or  components   including  toxins,
or  other biological material;
1.6 complex media  for the  growth of risk  groups IV, III and II microorganisms;
1.7 fermentation   vessels   (including   bioreactors, chemostats   and  continuous
flow  systems),  orbital  or reciprocal  shakers  and  shaking incubators
designed  or accepted for use for  the cultivation of microorganisms or
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eukaryotic  cells or  for  the production  of toxins,  and components   therefor,
including   control   units   for fermenters and other vessels;
1.8 recombinant nucleic acids (DNA and RNA), equipment and reagents36 for
their isolation, characterization or production and equipment  and reagents for
the construction of synthetic genes, including nucleic acid sequencing
equipment, nucleic acid synthesizers, electroporation or biolistics equipment,
thermal cyclers, electrophoresis  equipment, transilluminators, automatic work
stations and automatic data collection systems, and components therefor,
including derivatized  solid supports for solid phase nucleotide synthesis;
1.9 equipment  for the  release and/or  dispersal into the environment or into
cabinets, chambers, rooms or other enclosures of biological material and
equipment capable of being  modified for  such use, excluding  devices
designed for  personal use  in  self-administered  prophylactic  or therapeutic
preparations by inhalation, but including crop sprayers,  aircraft  sprayers  and
tanks,  other sprayers capable  of   chassis  mounting  and  tanks, jet engine
disseminators, aerosol disseminators, droplet disseminators, dry powder
disseminators (including  dry aerosol disseminators, venturi air movers and
nebulisers), mist generators  and foggers, including pulse jet disseminators;
1.10 equipment  designed  or   accepted  for  use  for studying the aerobiological
characteristics or aerosols of microorganisms,  their  components  including
toxins,  or other biological material  and equipment capable  of being modified
for such use, including aerosolization containers (drums,  cabinets, chambers,
rooms or other enclosures), nose-only aerosolization equipment and
aerodynamic particle-sizing equipment;
1.11 equipment  for  breeding  of  vectors  of  human, animal or plant diseases;
1.12 vaccines  for  risk  groups   IV,  III,  and   II microorganisms, whether for use
with humans or animals and whether licensed, unlicensed or experimental;
1.13 documents,37 information, software or  technology for the design,
development, use, storage,  manufacture,  maintenance  or  support  of items
listed in  the preceding subparagraphs of  this paragraph, or of biological
weapons or any component  thereof, or of biological and training activities or
defence; and
1.14 munitions,   rockets  or   missile  warheads     Delivery  systems are  addressed
in  annex IV.  capable of disseminating biological weapons agents.
2. The initial information under paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Plan  to be provided not
later  than 30 days after the adoption  of the Plan by the  Security Council shall cover the
period  from 1  January 1986.  Subsequent information shall  be provided each 15  January
and 15  July and shall cover the six-month  period prior to the  provision of the information.
                                                
36 Including dimethoxytrityl (DMT)-ribonucleosides and dimethoxytrityl (DMT)-deoxyribonucleosides.
37 "Documents"  means  blueprints, plans,  diagrams,  models,  formulae, tables,  engineering designs  or
specifications,  manuals or  instructions, and any database  or software  concerning risk groups  IV, III and II
microorganisms, toxins and genetic material, except those  generally available  to  the  public.
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Notifications under  paragraph 38 (a) of the Plan shall be provided not later than 60 days in
advance.
3. Whenever the  information that Iraq  is required  to provide  under section  D of  the
Plan  and this  annex is equal to nil, Iraq shall provide nil returns.
4. The information on each site or facility38  to  be provided  under section  D of  the
Plan shall  include the following:
4.1 the name of the site or facility and of the owner, company, or enterprise
operating the facility;
4.2 the location  of the  site or  facility (including the address, geographic
coordinates to the nearest second, and a site diagram.  Each diagram shall be
drawn  to scale and shall indicate the boundaries of the site or facility, all road
and rail entrances and all structures, indicating their purpose and  any structure
number. If  the site  or facility is  located within a larger  complex, the diagram
shall specify the  exact location of the site  or facility within the larger
complex);
4.3 the sources  and amounts of financing  of the site or facility and of its
activities;
4.4 the  main   purpose  of  the   site  or  facility, including research, development,
use, production, storage, testing, import and export;
4.5 the   level   of   protection,    including,   as applicable, the number and  size of
maximum containment or containment laboratories (units);
4.6 scope and description of activities, including, as applicable,   a   list   of  types
and   quantities   of microorganisms, toxins or vaccines and equipment and
other items specified in paragraph 1 of this annex;
4.7 a list of microorganisms and toxins, equipment and vaccines imported or
isolated  for the use of the  site or facility,   or  exported,   indicating  the
supplier  or recipient countries involved;
4.8 the date when the planned activities, as described in paragraphs 35 (a) to  35
(g) of the Plan, are  to begin at the site   or facility; and
4.9 the number of scientifically trained personnel and their main areas of
responsibility.
5. Information  on   imports   to  be   provided   under paragraphs  35 (g) and 38 (a)  of
the Plan shall cover the items  listed in the appendix to this annex and shall, for each import
into Iraq, specify:
                                                
38 Including sites or facilities involved in the import, export or storage of the equipment, biological material and
other items specified in paragraph 1 of this annex.
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5.1 types  and  quantities  of  microorganisms,  other organisms, toxins, genetic
material or vaccines;
5.2 quantities    of   any    equipment,   facilities, information, software,
technology or other items specified in the appendix to this annex;
5.3 country of export and the specific exporter;
5.4 point or port and time of entry into Iraq;
5.5 site  or  facility where  it  is  to be  used  and purpose of its use; and
5.6 name  of the  specific importing organization  in Iraq.
6. The information under paragraph 37 of the Plan shall be provided within seven days
of the occurrence and the standardized form contained in section III of the annex on
confidence-building measures in document BWC/CONF.III/23/II shall be utilized as
appropriate.
7. Iraq shall, not later than each 15 April, provide to the  Special Commission  the
copies of  the declarations, information  and data that Iraq has sent to the Centre for
Disarmament Affairs  of the United Nations Secretariat pursuant to the agreements  on
confidence-building measures, including  the exchange of information and data, reached at
the  Third Review Conference of  the Parties to the  Convention on  the  Prohibition  of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on  Their  Destruction  (document BWC/CONF.III/23/II and its annex on
confidence-building measures).
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APPENDIX
Items to be reported under paragraphs 35 (g) and 38 (a)
of the Plan and paragraph 5 of its annex III
1. Risk  groups IV and  III 39.  microorganisms, 40.  other organisms,  toxins,41 or genetic
material.
2. Biohazard  containment  and decontamination  items as follows:
2.1 facilities, rooms or other enclosures:
(a) meeting the physical containment criteria for P3 or  P4 (BL3,  BL4,
L3, L4)  biological containment  as specified in the WHO Laboratory
Biosafety  Manual (Geneva,1993); and
(b) constructed such that the number of particles of 0.5 microns in
diameter in the contained air  does not exceed 35,000 particles per
cubic metre;
2.2 biological safety cabinets meeting Class I, II, or III standards42 as  specified in the
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, including flexible film   isolators,  dry   boxes,  glove
boxes,  anaerobic chambers, interconnected cabinet lines, isolator lines and secondary
containment   systems   designed  to   enclose fermenters   or   downstream  processing
equipment,  and specially designed components therefor;
                                                
39 For the  purposes of the Plan, full  lists of  the microorganisms, other  organisms and toxins  concerned have
been enumerated in  two lists, one  covering risk groups IV  and III (List  1), the other covering risk group II
(List 2). These lists are contained in an  Explanatory Note which  follows on the  appendix to this  annex
40 "Microorganisms"  means bacteria,  viruses,  mycoplasmas,  rickettsiae  or  fungi, whether natural, enhanced
or  modified, either in the form of isolated  live  cultures, including  live  cultures  in dormant  form or  in  dried
preparations,  or as  material including  living  material  which has  been  deliberately inoculated  or
contaminated  with  such  cultures
41 Including  purified  or  crude material
42 The  specifications for Class I,  II and III  biological safety  cabinets  in  the  WHO  Laboratory Biosafety
manual are:
Class I cabinet:   an open-fronted, ventilated cabinet for personal protection with an unrecirculated
inward air flow away from the operator. It is fitted with a HEPA filter to protect the environment from
discharge of microorganisms;
Class II cabinet:  an open-fronted, ventilated cabinet for personal,  product  and  environmental
protection,  which provides an  inward air flow and  HEPA-filtered supply and exhaust  air.  There are
two main variations:   the Class IIA  type recirculates 70 per  cent of the  air; the Class IIB type
recirculates 30 per cent of the air; and
Class III cabinet:  a totally enclosed, ventilated cabinet which  is gastight  and is  maintained under
negative air pressure.  The supply air is HEPA-filtered and the exhaust air is passed through two HEPA
filters in series.  Work is performed with attached  long-sleeved gloves.
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2.3 HEPA filters;43
2.4 rubber  gloves  specially  designed  for  use with safety cabinets and biological
safety cabinets;
2.5 autoclaves   designed   to  sterilise   infectious material, with an internal
volume equal to or greater than 0.3  cubic  metres,   and  specially  designed
components therefor; and
2.6 positive  pressure  air-fed  suits,   half  suits, helmets and respirators, and
specially designed components therefor.
3. Fermentation equipment, as follows:
3.1 fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats, and continuous flow fermentation
systems and  specially designed components therefor;
3.2 other vessels suitable for use for the cultivation of  microorganisms  or
eukaryotic   cells  or  for  toxin production, capable  of operating without  the
propagation of aerosols, and capable of in situ steam sterilisation in the
closed  state,  and  specially  designed  components therefor;
3.3 orbital or  reciprocal shakers with  a total flask capacity  greater than  5 litres,
and specially  designed components therefor; and
3.4 shaking  incubators  with a  total  flask capacity greater than  5 litres, and
specially  designed components therefor.
4. Equipment usable for processing, handling, transporting or storing microorganisms,
their  products or components excluding personal and household equipment, but including
toxins, or  other biological material (including foodstuffs), as follows, and specially designed
components therefor:
4.1 centrifugal separators or decanters for continuous or semi-continuous
operation;
4.2 continuous flow centrifuge rotors;
4.3 plate press filter separators;
4.4 cross-flow  and tangential  filtration equipment with a filter area equal to or
greater than 0.5 m2;
4.5 spray drying equipment;
4.6 freeze-drying (lyophilisation)  equipment with  a condenser capacity greater
than 1 kg of ice in 24 hours;
                                                
43 The WHO  Laboratory Biosafety Manual defines HEPA filters as high efficiency particulate air filters.   They
should conform to  national standards and not more than three particles should be recovered when the filter is
challenged with a dose of 100,000 particles.
22
4.7 pressure  cell  disruption  and   continuous  flow ultrasonic cell disruption
equipment;
4.8 chromatography   columns  with   internal  volumes greater than  2 litres, and
specially  designed end pieces and flow adaptors for such columns;
4.9 milling  equipment  capable of  producing particle sizes of 10 microns or less;
4.10 drum drying equipment; and
4.11 jacketed vessels.
5. Formulated  powdered  complex  media or  concentrated liquid complex media for
growth of microorganisms.
6. Detection  and  assay  systems   for  microorganisms, toxins,  or  genetic  material  in
List  1  and  specially designed reagents therefor, as follows:
6.1 immunological assay systems;
6.2 gene probe assay systems; and
6.3 biological  agent  detection systems  designed for biological defence or civil
defence applications.
7. Equipment  and reagents for  use in molecular biology research,  as follows,  and
specially  designed components therefor:
7.1 nucleic acid sequencing equipment;
7.2 nucleic acid synthesizers;
7.3 electroporation or biolistics equipment;
7.4 thermal cyclers;
7.5 specially  designed  automatic  data  collection systems;
7.6 transilluminators;
7.7 electrophoresis equipment;
7.8 derivatized   solid   supports  for   solid  phase nucleotide synthesis;
7.9 dimethoxytrityl (DMT)-ribonucleosides; and
7.10 dimethoxytrityl (DMT)-deoxyribonucleosides.
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8.  Equipment capable  of dispersing aerosols  at a  flow rate exceeding 1 litre of liquid
suspension per minute  or 10 g of dry material per minute, as follows, and specially designed
components therefor:
8.1 crop sprayers;
8.2 aircraft sprayers and associated spray tanks;
8.3 other  sprayers, capable of  chassis mounting, and
associated spray tanks;
8.4 jet engine disseminators;
8.5 aerosol disseminators;
8.6 droplet disseminators;
8.7 dry  powder disseminators 44
8.8 mist generators; and
8.9 foggers
9. Equipment  usable   in  the  study  of  aerosols,  as follows, and specially designed
components therefor:
9.1 aerosolization drums, cabinets, chambers, rooms or other enclosures;
9.2 nose-only aerosolization equipment but not devices for personal prophylaxis
or  therapy  for  medical conditions; and
9.3 aerodynamic particle-sizing equipment.
10. Equipment  designed  for  the  microencapsulation  of living organisms,  their
products or  components including toxins, or other biological material.
11. Vaccines  for microorganisms  or  toxins  in List  1, whether  for  use  with  humans
or  animals  and  whether licensed, unlicensed or experimental.
12. Documents 45, information,  software  or  technology  for   the  design, development,
use,  storage,  manufacture, maintenance  or support of entries 1 to 11 above, or of biological
weapons or  any component  thereof, or  of biological  defence and training activities or
defence.
                                                
44Including  dry aerosol disseminators, venturi air movers and nebulisers.
44Including pulse jet disseminators.
,45"Document" means  blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs or
specifications, manuals or  instructions, and any database or  software  pertaining  to  microorganisms,  toxins
and genetic material  of List 1 items  except those containing information   generally   available    to   the
public.
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13. Munitions, rockets  and missile warheads46 capable   of disseminating biological
weapons agents.
                                                
46Delivery systems   are   addressed   in  annex   IV.
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EXPLANATORY NOTE
UNSCOM   Biological   Lists   based   on   the classification in the
World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  Laboratory Biosafety Manual
LIST  1  -  Risk  Groups   IV  and  III Microorganisms,47
other Organisms and Toxins
1.1 Bacteria
1.1.1 Bacillus anthracis
1.1.2 Bacillus cereus
1.1.3 Bacillus subtilis
1.1.4 Bacillus megaterium
1.1.5 Bacillus thuringensis
1.1.6 Brucella abortus
1.1.7 Brucella melitensis
1.1.8 Brucella suis
1.1.9 Chlamydia psittaci
1.1.10 Clostridium botulinum
1.1.11 Clostridium perfringens
1.1.12 Francisella tularensis
1.1.13 Pseudomonas mallei
1.1.14 Pseudomonas pseudomallei
1.1.15 Salmonella  typhi (Salmonella  enterica var typhi)
1.1.16 Serratia marcescens
1.1.17 Shigella dysenteriae
1.1.18 Vibrio cholera
1.1.19 Yersinia pestis (Yersinia pseudotuberculosis var pestis)
1.1.20 Xanthomonas albilineans
1.1.21 Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri including strains referred to as
Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri types A, B, C, D, E or otherwise classified
as Xanthomonas citri, Xanthomonas campestris pv. aurantifolia or
Xanthomonas campestris pv. citrumelo
1.2 Mycoplasma
1.2.1 Mycoplasma mycoides
1.3 Rickettsiae
1.3.1 Coxiella burnetii
1.3.2 Rickettsia prowasecki
1.3.3 Rickettsia quintana
1.3.4 Rickettsia rickettsii
1.4 Viruses
                                                
47The items  in this list do not conform fully  with  the  criteria  for risk  groups  IV  and  III according to  the
classification in the  1983 World Health Organization (WHO) Laboratory  Biosafety Manual but should be
considered as  doing so  for  the purposes  of ongoing monitoring and verification activities in Iraq.
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1.4.1 African swine fever virus
1.4.2 Avian influenza virus
1.4.3 Bluetongue virus
1.4.4 Chikungunya virus
1.4.5 Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus
1.4.6 Dengue fever virus
1.4.7 Eastern equine encephalitis virus
1.4.8 Ebola virus
1.4.9 Foot and mouth disease virus
1.4.10 Goat pox virus
1.4.11 Hantaan virus
1.4.12 Human influenza
1.4.13 Japanese encephalitis virus
1.4.14 Junin virus
1.4.15 Lassa fever virus
1.4.16 Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
1.4.17 Lyssa virus
1.4.18 Machupo virus
1.4.19 Marburg virus
1.4.20 Monkey pox virus
1.4.21 Newcastle disease virus
1.4.22 Peste des petits ruminants virus
1.4.23 Porcine herpes virus (Aujeszky's disease)
1.4.24 Rift Valley fever virus
1.4.25 Rinderpest virus
1.4.26 Sheep pox virus
1.4.27 Swine fever virus (Hog cholera virus)
1.4.28 Swine Vesicular    disease     (Porcine enterovirus type 9)
1.4.29 Teschen disease virus
1.4.30 Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis 
virus)
1.4.31 Variola virus
1.4.32 Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
1.4.33 Vesicular stomatitis virus
1.4.34 Western equine encephalitis virus
1.4.35 White pox virus
1.4.36 Yellow fever virus
1.5 Toxins
1.5.1 Abrin
1.5.2 Botulinum toxins
1.5.3 Clostridium perfringens toxins
1.5.4 Conotoxin
1.5.5 Diphtheria exotoxin
1.5.6 Microcystins (Cyanginosins)
1.5.7 Modeccin
1.5.8 Pseudomonas exotoxin
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1.5.9 Ricin 48
1.5.10 Saxitoxin 72
1.5.11 Shiga toxin
1.5.12 Staphylococcus aureus toxins
1.5.13 Tetrodotoxin
1.5.14 Verotoxin
1.5.15 Volkensin
1.6 Fungi
1.6.1 Colletotrichum cof feanum var. virulans
1.6.2 Cochliobolus  miyabeanus  (Helminthosporium oryzae)
1.6.3 Magnaporthe grisea  (Pyricularia grisea/Pyricularia oryzae)
1.6.4 Microcyclus ulei (syn. Dothidella ulei)
1.6.5 Puccinia  graminis (syn.  Puccinia graminis f. sp. tritici)
1.6.6 Pucciniastriiformis (syn.Puccinia glumarum)
1.7 Other organisms
1.7.1 Eukaryotic  (non-microbial) organism  which produce any listed toxin.
1.8 Genetically  modified  microorganisms,  other organisms  and genetic material
1.8.1 The  above listed microorganisms  when they have been genetically modified.
1.8.2 Other  genetically  modified  microorganisms  or genetic  material  that
contain  nucleic  acid  sequences derived  from any  of the  listed
microorganisms,  or that contain   nucleic   acid    sequences   associated
with pathogenicity determinants of any listed microorganism; or that  contain
nucleic  acid sequences associated  with any listed toxin.
1.8.3 Genetically  modified   variants  of  eukaryotic (non-microbial) organisms
which produce any listed toxin.
                                                
48 Items   1.5.9   and  1.5.10   are prohibited  to Iraq  save under  the procedure  of special exceptions provided
for in paragraph 32 of the Plan.
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LIST 2 - RISK GROUP II MICROORGANISMS, 49OTHER ORGANISMS AND TOXINS
(A) HUMAN AND ANIMAL PATHOGENS
Bacteria
Actinobacillus actinomycetemcomitans
Actinomadura madurae
Actinomadura pelletieri
Actinomyces gerencseriae
Actinomyces israelii
Actinomyces pyogenes
Actinomyces spp
Arcanobacterium  haemolyticum  (Corynebacterium haemolyticum)
Bacteriodes fragilis
Bartonella bacilliformis
Bordetella bronchiseptica
Bordetella parapertussis
Bordetella pertussis
Borrelia burgdorferi
Borrelia duttonii
Borrelia recurrentis
Borrelia spp
Brucella canis
Campylobacter jejuni
Campylobacter spp
Cardiobacterium hominis
Chlamydia pneumoniae
Chlamydia trachomatis
Clostridium tetani
Corynebacterium diphtheriae
Corynebacterium minutissimum
Corynebacterium spp
Edwardsiella tarda
Ehrlichia sennetsu (Rickettsia sennetsu)
Ehrlichia spp
Elkenella corrodens
Enterobacter aerogenes/cloacae
Enterobacter spp
Enterococcus spp
Erysipelothrix rhusiopathiae
Escherichia coli (except non-pathogenic strains)
Flavobacterium meningosepticum
Fluoribacter bozemanae (Legionella)
                                                
49 The items in  this list do not conform fully with the criteria for risk group II  according  to the  classification
in  the 1983  World Health  Organization (WHO) Laboratory Biosafety Manual but should  be considered  as
doing so  for  the purposes  of ongoing  monitoring and  verification activities  in Iraq.
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Fusobacterium necrophorum
Gardnerella vaginalis
Haemophilus ducreyi
Haemophilus influenzae
Haemophilus spp
Helicobacter pylori
Klebsiella oxytoca
Klebsiella pneumoniae
Klebsiella spp
Legionella pneumophila
Legionella spp
Listeria ivanovii
Morganella morganii
Mycobacterium africanum
Mycobacterium chelonae
Mycobacterium fortuitum
Mycobacterium kansasii
Mycobacterium leprae
Mycobacterium malmoense
Mycobacterium marinum
Mycobacterium microti
Mycobacterium scrofulaceum
Mycobacterium simiae
Mycobacterium szulgai
Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Mycobacterium ulcerans
Mycobacterium xenopl
Mycoplasma pneumoniae
Neisseria gonorrhoeae
Neisseria meningitidis
Nocardia asteroides
Nocardia brasiliensis
Nocardia farcinica
Nocardia nova
Nocardia otitidiscaviarum
Pasteurella multocida
Peptostreptococcus anaerobius
Plesiomonas shigelloides
Porphyromonas spp
Proteus mirabilis
Proteus penneri
Proteus vulgaris
Providencia alcalifaciens
Providencia rettgeri
Providencia spp
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Rhodococcus egui
Salmonella arizonae
Salmonella enteritidis
Salmonella typhimurium
Salmonella paratyphi A,B,C
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Salmonella (other serovars)
Serpulina spp
Shigella boydii
Shigella flexneri
Shigella sonnel
Staphylococcus aureus
Streptobacillus moniliformis
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Streptococcus pyogenes
Streptococcus spp
Treponema carateum
Treponema pallidum
Treponema pertenue
Treponema spp
Vibrio parahaemolyticus
Vibrio spp
Yersinia pseudotuberculosis
Yersinia spp
Rickettsia
Rickettsia akari
Rickettsia canada
Rickettsia conorii
Rickettsia montana
Rickettsia spp
Rickettsia typhi (Rickettsia mooseri)
Rickettsia tsutsugamushi
Viruses
Absettarov
Acute haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus
Adenoviridae
Astroviridae
Australia encephalitis (Murray Valley encephalitis)
BK and JC viruses
Buffalo pox virus
Bunyamwera virus
California encephalitis virus
Central European tick-borne encephalitis virus
Coltiviruses
Coronaviridae
Cow pox virus
Coxsackie viruses
Cytomega lovirus
Echo viruses
Elephant pox virus
Epstein-Barr virus
Hantaviruses
Hanzalova
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Hazara virus
Hepatitis A virus (human enterovirus type 72)
Hepatitis B virus
Hepatitis C virus
Hepatitis D virus (Delta)
Herpes virus simiae (b virus)
Herpes simplex viruses types l and 2
Herpesvirus varicella-zoster
Human B-lymphotropic virus
Human Papillomaviruses
Human Parvovirus (B19)
Human Rotaviruses
Hypr
Influenza viruses types A,B and C
Kumlinge
Kyasanur Forest
Louping Ill
Measles virus
Milkers' node virus
Mopeia virus and other Tacaribe viruses
Mumps virus
Norwalk virus
Omsk
Orbiviruses
Orf virus
Oropouche virus
Other Bunvaviridae known to be pathogenic
Other Caliciviridae
Other Flaviviruses known to be pathogenic
Other Hantaviruses
Parainfluenza viruses types 1 to 4
Polioviruses
Powassan
Prospect Hill virus
Puumala virus
Rabbit pox virus
Reoviruses
Respiratory syncytial virus
Rhinoviruses
Rocio
Sandfly fever
Seoul virus
St. Louis Encephalitis
Tick-borne Orthomyxoviridae:  Dhori and Thogoto viruses
Toscana virus
Vaccinia virus
Wesselsbron virus
West Mile fever virus
Yatapox virus (Tana & Yaba)
(B) OTHER ANIMAL PATHOGENS
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Actinomyces spp
African horse sickness virus
Anaplasma marginale
Avian encephalomyelitis virus
Avian infectious bronchitis virus
Avian infectious laryngotracheitis virus
Avian leucosis virus
Babesia spp
Bacteroides nodosus
Bordetella bronchiseptica
Borrelia anserina
Bovine malignant catarrhal fever virus
Bovine virus diarrhoea virus
Campylobacter fetus
Canine distemper virus
Caprine arthritis/encephalitis virus
Clostridium chauvoei
Clostridium spp
Coccidia spp
Cochliomyia hominivorax
Corynebacterium pseudotuberculosis
Cowdria ruminantum
Cysticercus bovis
Cysticercus cellulosae
Dermatophilus congolensiae
Duck hepatitis virus
Duck virus enteritis virus
Echinococcus spp
Enzootic bovine leucosis virus
Equine herpesvirus 3
Equine infectious anaemia virus
Equine influenza virus type A
Equine rhinopneumonitis virus
Erynipelou rhosiopathiae
Fowl pox virus
Haemophilus equigenitaliom
Haemophilus paragallinarum
Histoplasma jaraiminosom
Horse pox virus
Hypoderma spp
Infectious arteritis virus
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus
Infectious bursal disease virus
Leishmania spp
Leptospira spp
Listeria monocytogenes
Lumpy skin disease virus
Maedi-visna virus
Mareks disease virus
Mycobacterium avium
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Mycobacterium bovis
Mycobacterium paratuberculosis
Mycoplasma agalactiae
Mycoplasma capricolum var capripneumoniae
Mycoplasma gallisepticum
Myxomatosis virus
Nairobi sheep disease virus
Pasteurella haemolytica
Pasteurella multocida
Pasteurella tularensis
Porcine enteroviruses
Psoroptes ovis
Rabies and rabies related viruses
Salmonella abortus equi
Salmonella abortus ovis
Salmonella gallinarum
Salmonella pullorum
Salmonella spp
Sheep pulmonary adenomatosis virus
Streptococcus equi
The agent of Bovine Spongiforme encephalopathy
The   agent   of  porcine   reproductive  respiratory syndrome
The agent of scrapie
The agents of horse mange
Theileria spp
Toxoplasma gondii
Transmissible gastroenteritis virus
Trichinella spiralis
Trichomonas fetus
Trypanoroma evansi
Trypanosoma spp
Viral haemarrhagic disease of rabbits virus
(C) PLANT PATHOGENS
Citrus greening bacterium
Citrus tristeza closterovirus
Fusarium oxysporum f.sp. albedinis
Glomerella gossypii
Phymatotrichopsis omnivora
Pseudomonas solanacearum Race 2
Thecaphora solani
Tilletia indica
Xanthomonas oryzae pvs oryzae & oryzicola
Tricothecene-producing fungi including:
Fusarium poae
Fusarium sporotrichioides
Fusarium tricinctum
Micronectriella nivalis, anamorph
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Microdochium nivale (Syn. Fusarium nivale)
 (D) TOXINS
Toxins  other  than  specified   on  List  1  with  a molecular weight of more than 250
daltons.
(E) OTHER ORGANISMS
Eukaryotic  (non-microbial)  organisms which  produce any toxin.
(F) GENETICALLY MODIFIED MICROORGANISMS, OTHER ORGANISMS AND
GENETIC MATERIAL
1. The  above listed  microorganisms when they have been genetically modified.
2. Other genetically modified microorganisms or genetic material that contain
nucleic acid sequences derived from any of the listed  microorganisms, or that
contain nucleic acid sequences associated with  pathogenicity determinants of
any listed microorganism;  or that contain nucleic acid sequences associated
with any listed toxin.
3. Genetically modified variants of eukaryotic (non-microbial)  organisms  which
produce any toxin as above.
